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The application of EC law to defence industries—changing interpretations of 
Article 296 EC 
Panos Koutrakos* 
Introduction  
For a long time, defence industries were considered to be entirely beyond the reach of 
EU law. Their function for the organization of national defence was deemed to place 
them at the core of national sovereignty, a space much removed from the 
incrementally developing purview of Community law and the increasingly expanding 
jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice. The validity of this view was purported 
to be substantiated by Article 296 EC, a rather obscure provision of the EC Treaty 
which refers specifically to arms, munitions and war materials.  
 
However, recent developments have questioned this assumption, highlighted its flaws 
and gradually rendered defence industries at the centre of an increasingly multilayered 
legislative and political dialogue at EU level. These developments are legal, political 
and economic in nature and are all interrelated in their implications.  
 
This Chapter will tell the story of this gradual shift of the position of defence 
industries from the margins of European integration to the centre of EU policy-
making. In doing so, it will chart this development, explain its significance and set out 
its constitutional, institutional and political implications for the EU and its Member 
States.  
 
The position according to primary law: Article 296 EC  
The only provision in the EC Treaty referring expressly to defence industries is 
Article 296 EC. It reads as follows:  
1. The provisions of this Treaty shall not preclude the application of the following 
rules: 
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(a) no Member State shall be obliged to supply information the disclosure of which it 
considers contrary to the essential interests of its security; 
(b) any Member state may take such measures as it considers necessary for the 
protection of the essential interests of its security which are concerned with the 
production of or trade in arms, munitions and war material; such measures shall not 
adversely affect the conditions of competition in the common market regarding 
products which are not intended for specifically military purposes.   
2. The Council may, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission, make 
changes to the list, which it drew up on 15 April 1958, of the products to which the 
provisions of paragraph 1(b) apply.  
 
In essence, this obscure EC Treaty provision introduces a public security derogation. 
However, it goes considerably further than the other similar derogations provided in 
the areas of free movement of goods (Article 30 EC), persons (Article 39(3) EC and 
Article 46 EC) and capital (Article 48(1)(b) EC) in so far as it authorizes the Member 
States to deviate from the entire body of EC law. It is for this reason that, while the 
above provisos are exceptional Article 296 EC has been viewed by the Court of 
Justice as ‘wholly exceptional’1 The implications of this definition are twofold: on the 
one hand, there is no limit to the type of measure which a Member State may adopt 
and, on the other hand, in adopting such a measure, the State in question may deviate 
from the entire body of EC law.  
 
The ‘wholly exceptional’ nature of Article 296 EC is further illustrated by the 
provision of an extraordinary procedure for judicial review. This is set out in Article 
298 EC which reads as follows:  
 
                                                 
1
 Case 222/84 Johnston, n1 above, para. 27. See also the Opinion of AG Jacobs in Case C-120/94 
Commission v Greece (re: FYROM) ECR I-1513 at para. 46. The other such EC provision is Article 
297 EC which is remarkably badly drafted: ‘Member states shall consult each other with a view to 
taking together the steps needed to prevent the functioning of the common market being affected by 
measures which a Member State may be called upon to take in the event of serious internal 
disturbances affecting the maintenance of law and order, in the event of war, serious international 
tension constituting a threat of war, or in order to carry out obligations it has accepted for the purpose 
of maintaining peace and international security’. On the interpretation of this provision, see Koutrakos, 
‘Is Article 297 EC “a reserve of sovereignty”?’, (2000) 37 CMLRev 1339.  
 
3 
If measures taken in the circumstances referred to in Articles 296 and 297 have the 
effect of distorting the conditions of competition in the common market, the 
Commission shall, together with the State concerned, examine how these measures 
can be adjusted to the rules laid down in the Treaty. 
By way of derogation from the procedure laid down in Articles 226 and 227, the 
Commission or any Member state may bring the matter directly before the Court of 
Justice if it considers that another Member state is making improper use of the 
powers provided for in Articles 296 and 297. The Court of Justice shall give its ruling 
in camera.   
 
While badly drafted and wide-ranging both in its content and implications, the 
‘wholly exceptional clause’ of Article 296 EC does not grant Member states a carte 
blanche. This conclusion follows not only from the oft-repeated principle that the 
exceptional clauses set out in the EC Treaty ‘deal with exceptional cases which are 
clearly defined and which do not lend themselves to any wide interpretation’2 but also 
from the wording of the EC Treaty provision itself. First, it is confined to the products 
which are described in the Article 296(2) EC list. Therefore, the reference in Article 
296(1)(b) EC to ‘the production of or trade in arms, munitions and war material’ was 
not envisaged as an open-ended category of products. In this vein, it was not 
envisaged that products which may be of both civil and military application (that is 
dual-use goods) should be regulated by national measures deviating from the entire 
body of EC law. This is supported not only by the content of the Article 296(2) EC 
list but also the reference to the effects that such measures should not have on 
‘products which are not intended for specifically military purposes’ in Article 
296(1)(b) EC.  
 
Second, national measures deviating from EC law must be deemed ‘necessary for the 
protection of the essential interests of [national] security’. This is quite an emphatic 
statement that Article 296(b) EC is not merely a public security clause: instead, it 
                                                 
2
 Case 13/68 Salgoil Salgoil SpA vItalian Ministry for Foreign Trade [1968] ECR 453, 463, Case 
222/84 Marguerite Johnston v Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary [1986] ECR 1651, 
para. 26.. 
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should be invoked only when the protection of the core of national sovereignty is at 
stake.   
 
Third, any reliance upon Article 296 EC should take into account the effects it may 
have on the status and movement of other products which fall beyond its rather 
narrow scope. In effect, this provision suggests that national measures deviating from 
EC law as a whole should not be adopted in a legal vacuum. Instead, Member States 
are under a duty to consider the implications that such measures may have for the 
common market.  
 
Fourth, Article 298 subpara. 1 EC provides for the involvement of the Commission in 
cases where reliance upon Article 296 EC by a Member State would lead to 
distortions of competition. This provision should be interpreted in the light of the duty 
of loyal cooperation enshrined in Article 10 EC. In other words, a Member State 
invoking Article 296 EC is under a legal duty to cooperate with the Commission in 
order to adjust any ensuing distortions of competition to the EC rules.  
 
Finally, any deviation from EC law pursuant to Article 296 EC is subject to the 
jurisdiction of the Court of Justice. The reference to the ‘improper use of the powers 
provided for in Article… 296’ in Article 298 subpara. 2 EC refers both to the 
substantive conditions which need to be met by a Member State invoking Article 296 
EC (namely those regarding its scope of application, the assessment of ‘essential 
interests of security’) and the procedural ones (that is the duty to cooperate with the 
Commission inferred from Article 298 subpara. 1 EC).  
 
Prevailing interpretations of Article 296 EC  
 
It follows from the above that, according to a strict reading of Articles 296 and 298 
EC, the right of Member States to regulate their defence industries by deviating from 
the entire scope of the acquis communautaire was confined to a specific class of 
products, should be exercised in accordance with certain principles, and was subject 
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to the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice should its exercise amount to an abuse of 
power. However, contrary to this interpretation, Article 296 EC was viewed for a long 
time as rendering defence industries beyond the scope of EC law altogether.3 
 
On the one hand, the Member States were only too eager to assume that Article 296 
EC applied to the defence products generally, without engaging in any assessment of 
whether the specific conditions laid down therein were met. A case in point is public 
procurement: as the Commission points out, the low number of publications in the 
Official Journal appears to imply that some Member States believe they can apply the 
derogation automatically.4 This approach was not challenged directly by the EU 
institutions for a long time. While none of the latter suggested that armaments were, 
in principle, beyond the scope of EC law, in practice they shied away from any 
controversy which would raise the question of the position of defence industries in the 
EC legal order, the extent to which this should be covered under EC law and the 
leeway which Member States enjoyed under Article 296 EC. It is noteworthy that, 
since the establishment of the Community, there has only been only one infringement 
action against a Member State the subject matter of which was armaments.5 In the 
context of specific procedures, such as in the area of state aids, the Commission 
examined the compatibility of a national measure with Article 296 EC only in terms 
of whether that measure applied to products intended solely for products of a 
specifically military nature.6 
 
On the other hand, the fate of the list of products to which Article 296 (2) EC refers is 
indicative of the ambiguity into which the ratio of Article 296 EC was shrouded.  
While it was drawn up, as Council Decision 255/58, in April 1958, it was not 
published in the EC Treaty or in any official document. Over the years, it was 
                                                 
3
 See P Koutrakos, Trade, Foreign Policy and Defence in EU Constitutional Law (Hart Publishing 
2001) 175-182. 
4
 COM (2004) 608 fin Green Paper on Defence Procurement, p6. 
5
 Case C-414/97 Commission v Spain [1999] ECR I-5585. See the analysis in M Trybus, European 
Union Law and Defence Integration (Hart Publishing 2005) 152-154. 
6
 See, for instance, Dec. 1999/763/EC on the measures, implemented and proposed, by the Federal 
State of Bremen, Germany in favour of Lürssen Maritime Beteiligungen GmbH & Co KG [1999] OJ L 
301/8. 
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published in certain academic publications7 and it was only in 2001 when it became 
publicly available by the European Commission in a response to a question at the 
European Parliament.8 The list is quite broad.9 This rather elusive quality of the list 
appeared to enhance the general view that defence industries were somehow afforded 
a special kind of protection under EU law.  
 
Gradually questioning old assumptions: legal and economic developments   
 
In the 1990s, a cautious and distinctly gradual shift developed in relation to the 
position of Article 296 EC in our EU vocabulary. This was due to a variety of factors. 
One of them was the case -law of the EU Courts. The first judgment on the 
applicability of Article 296 EC was delivered by the Court of Justice in Case C-
414/97 Commission v Spain.10 This was about Spanish legislation exempting from 
VAT intra-Community imports and acquisitions of arms, munitions and equipment 
exclusively for military use. The Sixth VAT Directive excluded aircraft and warships. 
The action against Spain was brought because the relevant Spanish rules also covered 
an additional range of defence products. The Spanish Government argued that a VAT 
exemption for armaments constituted a necessary measure for the purposes of 
guaranteeing the achievement of the essential objectives of its overall strategic plan 
and, in particular, to ensure the effectiveness of the Spanish armed forces both in 
national defence and as part of NATO.  
 
                                                 
7
 See H Wulf (ed.) Arms Industry Limited (OUP 1993) at 214.  
8
 Written Question E-1324/01 [2001] OJ C 364E/85.  
9
 It covers the following categories, some of which are further divided into subcategories: 1. Portable 
and automatic firearms. 2. Artillery, and smoke, gas and flame throwing weapons. 3. Ammunition for 
the weapons at 1 and 2 above. 4. Bombs, torpedoes, rockets and guided missiles. 5. Military fire control 
equipment. 6. Tanks and specialist fighting vehicles. 7. Toxic or radioactive agents. 9. Warships and 
their specialist equipment. 10. Aircraft and equipment for military use. 11. Military electronic 
equipment. 12. Cameras specially designed for military use. 13. Other equipment and material. 14. 
Specialised parts and items of material included in this list insofar as they are of a military nature. 15. 
Machines, equipment and items exclusively designed for the study, manufacture, testing and control of 
arms, munitions and apparatus of an exclusively military nature included in this list. 
10
 See n5 above. 
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The Court of Justice held that, as in other public safety clauses set out in the EC 
Treaty, ‘it is for the Member State which seeks to rely on those exceptions to furnish 
evidence that the exemptions in question do not go beyond the limits of such cases’.11 
It went on to point out that ‘Spain has not demonstrated that the exemptions provided 
for by the Spanish Law are necessary for the protection of the essential interests of its 
security. It is clear from the preamble to [the relevant national] Law that its principal 
objective is to determine and allocate the financial resources for the reinforcement and 
modernization of the Spanish armed forces by laying the economic and financial basis 
for its overall strategic plan. It follows that the VAT exemptions are not necessary in 
order to achieve the objective of protecting the essential interests of the security of the 
Kingdom of Spain’.12 
 
In addition to the above, the Court reiterated an economic argument, already made by 
Advocate General Saggio: ‘the imposition of VAT on imports and acquisitions of 
armaments would not compromise that objective since the income from payment of 
VAT on the transactions in question would flow into the State’s coffers apart from a 
small percentage which would be diverted to the Community as own resources’.13 
 
The judgment is characterized by a distinct focus on a construction of Article 296 EC 
which would not render it a carte blanche for the Member States. The conditions laid 
down in that provision were viewed as substantive conditions which needed to be met 
in a manner about which Member States need to convince the Court of Justice. This 
appeared to remove defence industries from a twilight zone of EC law and put the 
onus on the Member States for to justifying their exceptional status of particular 
defence industries on a case-by-case basis. 
 
                                                 
11
 Para. 22. For the strict interpretation of the exemptions set out in the public procurement measures, 
see Case C-324/93 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Evans Medical and 
MacFarlane Smith LTD [1995] ECR I-563 at para. 48. 
12
 See n5 above, para. 22. 
13
 Ibid, para. 23. 
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Four years, later, in 2003, the Court of First Instance delivered a judgment in Case T-
26/01 Fiocchi.14 In this case, the applicant, an Italian undertaking operating in the 
arms and munitions manufacturing and marketing sector, complained to the 
Commission about subsidies granted by the Spanish government to a Spanish arms 
production undertaking and enquired about their compatibility with the EC Treaty 
competition provisions as well as Article 296 EC. The Commission, then, entered in 
communication with the Spanish Government and requested information from the 
Spanish Government as to the nature and amount of the aid granted. When more than 
15 months had passed and , the applicant had heard nothing, it brought an action 
against the Commission for a declaration of failure to act.  
 
It is interesting that the Spanish undertaking which received the subsidies in question 
also produced engines for civil aviation and components for olive oil decanting 
equipment. This illustrates thate type of issues which the Commission needs to 
explore in cases of alleged use of Article 296 EC. The action was dismissed by the 
CFI as inadmissible, because the Commission, following the complaint by the 
applicant, had defined its position and, therefore, there was no failure to act within the 
meaning of Article 232 EC. Nevertheless, the CFI did engage in an examination of 
both Articles 296 EC and 298 EC. In relation to the former, it acknowledged the 
‘particularly wide discretion [conferred on the Member States] in assessing the needs 
receiving such protection’ under Article 296 EC. However, the CFI made it clear that 
the special protection set out in that provision is limited to the Article 296(2) EC list.15 
In relation to the latter, tThe CFI also referred to the bilateral examination which it set 
out to be carried out by tthe Commission and the Member State concerned are 
required to carry out under Article 298 EC and pointed out that the Commission 
former is not under no duty required to adopt a decision concerning the measures at 
issue at the conclusion of the examination; provided therein; the Commission has not 
power to address a final decision or directive to the Member State concerned. 
 
                                                 
14
 [2003] ECR II-3951. 
15
 To that effect, see also the Opinion of AG Jacobs in Case C-367/89 Richardt et Les Accessoires 
Scientifiques SNC  [1991] ECR I-4621 at para. 30. 
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In terms of the substance of the dispute, the applicant argued that the subsidies in 
question benefited the export activities of the company receiving them and, as such, 
fell beyond the scope of Article 296 EC.  This was a point which the Commission 
pursued with the Spanish authorities and whose explanations appeared to be deemed 
credible. .  
 
Finally, the Court of Justice reinforced the wholly exceptional nature of Article 296 
EC in three rulings on the application of sex equality rules in the armed forces. In 
Case C-273/97 Sirdar,16 Case C-285/98 Kreil17 and Dory,18 it ruled that all the EC 
Treaty exceptional provisions, including Article 296 EC,  
 
‘deal with exceptional and clearly defined cases. It is not possible to infer from 
those articles that there is inherent in the Treaty a general exception covering 
all measures taken for reasons of public security. To recognise the existence of 
such an exception, regardless of the specific requirements laid down by the 
Treaty, might impair the binding nature of Community law and its uniform 
application’.19 
 
In addition to the correct interpretation of Article 296 EC stressed by the Court in its 
case-law, another development which questioned the validity of the position of 
defence industries as entirely beyond the reach of EC law was of anthe change of 
political and economic natureclimate. Following the end of the Cold War, the defence 
industries in the Member States suffered from considerable financial and structural 
problems: fragmentation and divergence of capabilities, excess production capability 
in certain areas and shortages in others, duplication, short production runs, reduced 
                                                 
16
 [1999] ECR I-7403. 
17
 [2000] ECR I-69. 
18
 [2003] ECR I-2479. 
19
 Case C-273/97 Sirdar, n16 above at paras 16, Case C-285/98 Kreil, n17 above at para. 16 and Case 
C-186/01 Dori, n18 above at paras 30-31. For a comment, see P Koutrakos, ‘How far is far enough? 
EC law and the organisation of the armed forces after Dory’, (2003) 66 Modern Law Review 759 and 
M Trybus, European Union Law and Defence Integration (2005Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2005) Ch. 6. 
Comment [CB2]: Do you know what the 
outcome was? 
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budgetary resources, and failure to engage in increasingly costly research.20 This 
highly fragmented state gave rise to a number of initiatives, originating in both 
industry and State bodies, to achieve a degree of convergence which would enhance 
the competitiveness of the European defence industries.  
 
Against this background of economic and structural deterioration, the European 
Commission took the initiative in the late 1990s and put forward a comprehensive 
approach to the restructuring and consolidation of the defence industries of the 
Member States. Based on an assessment of the economic problems and challenges 
facing their fragmented state in an increasingly globalised market,21 it adopted a 
document entitled Implementing European Union Strategy on Defence Related 
Industries.22 This suggested a detailed set of legal measures which was 
comprehensive in scope and covered areas such as public procurement, defence and 
technological development, standardisation and technical harmonisation, competition 
policy, structural funds, export policies and import duties on military equipment. This 
document articulated the need for a wide synergy of Community, EU, national and 
international measures whilst while affirming the link between their subject matter 
and the core of national sovereignty.  
 
However, this initiative was not taken up by the Member States. In response to a 
request by the European Parliament, the Commission returned to the issues raised by 
the need for the consolidation of the defence industries in 2003. In a document 
adopted that year, it reiterated the need for a coherent cross-pillar approach to the 
legal regulation of defence industries with special emphasis on standardisation, intra-
Community transfers, competition, procurement, exports of dual-use goods and 
research.23 
                                                 
20
 See, amongst others, A. Georgopoulos, ‘The European Armaments Policy: A condition sine qua non 
for the European Security and Defence Policy?’ in M Trybus and N White, European Security Law 
(Oxford, OUP 2007) 198 at 203-205. 
21
 COM(96) 10 final The Challenges facing the European Defence-Related Industry. A Contribution 
for Action at European Level, adopted on 24/1/1996. 
22
 COM(97) 583 final, adopted on 12/11/1997.    
23
 COM(2003) 113 fin European Defence – Industrial and Market Issues. Towards an EU Defence 
Equipment Policy (adopted on 11/3/2003).   
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The recent initiative by the Commission: clarifying the application of Art. 296 
EC 
 
In December 2006, the Commission adopted the Interpretative Communication on the 
application of Article 296 of the Treaty in the field of defence procurement.24 Its 
objective is ‘to prevent possible misinterpretation and misuse of Article 296 EC in the 
field of defence procurement’ and ‘give contract awarding authorities some guidance 
for their assessment whether the use of the exemption is justified’.25 
 
Drawing upon the wording of Article 296 EC and the Court’s case-law on the 
interpretation of the exceptional clause set out in primary and secondary legislation, 
the thrust of the Commission’s initiative is that ‘both the field and the conditions of 
application of Article 296 EC must be interpreted in a  restrictive way’. In relation to 
the former, and drawing upon the CFI judgment in Fiocchi, it is argued that the 
material scope of Article 296 EC is confined to the Article 296(2) EC list which is 
‘sufficiently generic to cover recent and future developments’, therefore enabling the 
exceptional clause to cover the procurement of services and works directly related to 
the goods included in the list, as well as modern, capability-focused acquisition 
methods.26 However, it would not cover dual-use goods, for whose procurement 
security interests may justify the exemption of EC rules only on the basis of the 
exceptional clause set out in the Public Procurement Directive.27  
 
In relation to the conditions of application of Article 296 EC, the Commission 
acknowledges the wide discsecretion granted to a Member State in order to determine 
whether its essential security interests ought to be protected by deviating from EC 
                                                 
24
 COM(2006) 779 final, adopted on 7 December 2006. On the area of defence procurement, see M 
Trybus, European Defence Procurement Law (Kluwer 1999). 
25
 P3.  
26
 P5. 
27
 On the other hand, the Commission argues that the procurement of dual-use goods may be covered 
by Art. 296(1)(a) EC ‘if the application of Community rules would oblige a Member State to disclose 
information prejudicial to the essential interests of its security’ (p6). 
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law. However, this discretion is not unfettered. To that effect, it is argued that any 
interests other than security ones, such as industrial or economic, cannot justify 
recourse to Article 296 EC even if they are connected with the production of and trade 
in arms, munitions and war material.28 Furthermore, the reference in Article 296 EC 
to ‘essential security interests’ is viewed as ‘limit[ing] possible exemptions to 
procurements which are of the highest importance for Member States’ military 
capabilities’.29 
 
The Commission’s Communication, then, refers to the role of the Member States. It 
states that it ‘is the Member States’ prerogative to define their essential security 
interests and their duty to protect them. The concept of essential security interests 
gives them flexibility in the choice of measure to protect those interests, but also a 
special responsibility to respect their Treaty obligations and not to abuse this 
flexibility’.30 This general understanding of the Member States’ role is further defined 
in relation to public procurement. The Commission argues that ‘the only way for 
Member Sstates to reconcile their prerogatives in the field of security with their 
Treaty obligations is to assess with great care for each procurement contract whether 
an exemption from Community rules is justified or not. Such case-by-case assessment 
[emphasis in the original] must be particularly rigorous at the borderline of Article 
296 EC where the use of the exemption may be controversial’.31  
 
The corollary of the above is the careful definition of the role of the Commission. It is 
described as follows:32  
 
                                                 
28
 To that effect, it is argued that ‘indirect non-military offsets which do not serve specific security 
interests but general economic interests, are not covered by Article 296 EC, even if they are related to a 
defence procurement contract exempted on the basis of that Article’ (p7).   
29
 Ibid. 
30
 Ibid. 
31
 P8. The document goes on to mention the particular questions which need to be addressed by the 
national authorities: ‘which essential security interest is concerned? What is the connection between 
this security interest and the specific procurement decision? Why is the non-application of the Public 
Procurement Directive in this specific case necessary for the protection of this essential security 
interest?’ (ibid). 
32
 Ibid. 
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It is not for the Commission to assess Member States’ essential security interests, nort 
which military equipment they procure to protect those interests. However, as 
guardian of the Treaty, the Commission may verify whether the conditions for 
exempting procurement contracts on the basis of Article 296 TEC are fulfilled.  
 
In such cases, it is for Member States to provide, at the Commission’s request, 
[emphasis in the original] the necessary information and prove that exemption is 
necessary for the protection of their essential security interests. The Court of Justice 
has repeatedly stated that “Article 10 EC makes it clear that the Member Sstates are 
required to cooperate in good faith with the enquiries of the Commission pursuant to 
Article 226 EC, and to provide the Commission with all the information requested for 
that purpose” [Case C-82/03 Commission v Italy, para. 15]. This concerns all 
investigations carried out by the Commission as guardian of the Treaty, including 
possible verifications of the applicability of Article 296 EC to defence contracts.  
 
Therefore, when the Commission investigates a defence procurement case, it is for 
the Member State concerned to furnish evidence that, under the specific conditions of 
the procurement at issue, application of the Community Directive would undermine 
the essential interests of its security. General references to the geographical and 
political situation, history and Alliance commitments are not sufficient in this context.  
 
The Commission’s initiative does not advocate either the abolition or the revision of 
Article 296 EC. In the past, such radical solutions had been advocated by the 
European Parliament33 which had viewed them as essential to the full application of 
the acquis communautaire to the defence industries.34 Instead, this wholly exceptional 
provision appears to carry out an understandable function in the whole context of EC 
law, namely to ensure that certain activities associated with the core of national 
sovereignty are not subject to the rules and principles set out in the EC Treaty and 
                                                 
33
 See, for instance, Resolution A3-0260/92 on the Community’s role in the supervision of arms 
exports and the armaments industry [1992] OJ C 284/138 at 142 and Resolution on the need for 
European controls on the export or transfer of arms [1995] OJ C 43/89 at 90, Resolution A3-0260/92 
[1992] OJ C 284/138 at 142. 
34
 The Parliament adopted subsequently a subtler position, asking for the revision of Article 296 EC 
and even pointing out its potential usefulness in shielding European defence industries from coming 
under the control of third-country companies: Report A4-76/97.  
Comment [TC4]: Should this be ‘nor’? 
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articulated by the Court of Justice. It is interesting that, in its effort to justify the 
retention of Article 296 EC, the Commission actually engages in a creative exercise of 
adjusting and updating the Article 296 (2) EC list: it states that it the list should be 
interpreted in a way which recognises developments in technology since the list was 
drawn up,  and the different practices now employed to procure such items, such as 
‘modern, capability-focused acquisition methods’ and the inclusion of contracts for 
related services and works. 35  
 
In its document, the Commission draws upon the very limited case-law of the EU 
judiciary time and again. By doing so, not only does it substantiate its approach but it 
also suggests that its initiative aims at consolidating and clarifying the existing 
position rather than introducing change in a highly sensitive area. The extent to which 
the Commission draws upon the Court’s case-law is by no means a novelty. It 
certainly lacks the direct interaction underpinning its response to the judgment in 
Cassis de Dijon where it underlined the latter’s policy ramifications introduced by 
Cassis and where it signalled a shift in the model of regulatory intervention.36 Neither 
does it suggest such a direct policy effect as that underpinning the revision of the 
common rules on exports of dual-use goods where Regulation 1334/2000 abandoned 
the previous inter-pillar regime37 and introduced new rules exclusively based on the 
Community legal framework with express reference in its preamble to the judgments 
in Werner38 and Leifer.39 Instead, the emphasis in the Commission’s document on the 
Court’s rulings aims to confine Article 296 EC to its proper context by clarifying the 
conditions under which Member States may invoke it. 
 
Furthermore, the Communication stresses the role of the Member States and the 
discretion which they enjoy in assessing whether the protection of their security 
warrants reliance upon Article 296 EC – the prerogative of the Member States to 
define their essential security interests is acknowledged time and again throughout the 
                                                 
35
 N24 above, p5. 
36
 ‘Communication from the Commission regarding the Cassis de Dijon judgment’, [1980] OJ C 256/2. 
37
 That was established under Regulation 3381/94 [1994] OJ L 367/1 and Decision 94/942/CFSP 
[1994] OJ L 367/8. 
38
 Case C-70/94 [1995] ECR I-3189.  
39
 Case C-83/94 [1995] ECR -3231. 
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document. What the Commission does not do is to bring this point to its natural 
conclusion and be clearer as to the corollary of the wide discretion enjoyed by the 
Member States, namely the inherently limited control which the Court of Justice may 
exercise pursuant to Article 298 EC. In another, albeit related, context, that of exports 
of dual-use goods, the Court of Justice stressed the discretion enjoyed by national 
authorities when adopting measures they deem necessary in order to guarantee public 
security and pointed out that it was itsthe exercise of their discretion in accordance 
with the principles of necessity and proportionality which was to be determined by 
national courts.40 In yet another context, that of Article 297 EC, Advocate General 
Jacobs stressed the highly subjective nature of the assessment that national authorities 
are called upon to make and the corresponding paucity of judicially applicable criteria 
for the exercise of judicial control of high intensity.41 In this vein, it is suggested that, 
in terms of the essential interests of national security, the Commission, in the context 
of Article 298 subparagraph 1 EC and the Court of Justice, in the context of Article 
298 subparagraph 2 EC, would only seek to establish only whether the argument put 
forward by the national Government is unreasonable.42 This interpretation, which 
differs from the application of the traditional proportionality test, is consistent with 
the wording and the general scheme of Articles 296 EC and 298 EC.   
 
Finally, the emphasis on the limited material scope of Article 296(1)(b) EC, the 
consultation procedure set out in order to address any ensuing distortions of 
competition under Article 298 subpara. 1 EC, and the role of the Commission, all 
point towards the proceduralisation of the exceptional powers set out in Article 296 
EC. This approach would allow the Commission to become more involved in cases 
where national authorities invoke this provision. Indeed, the entire Communication 
reads like a statement of intent, declaring the Commission’s readiness to step into 
areas of high political sensitivity. This political character of the document should not 
be underestimated, all the more so as the interpretation put forward is rather stating 
what, from a legal point of view, has been obvious. This political dimension is also 
recognised by the Commission which seeks to strike the balance between its more 
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pronounced role and the discretion enjoyed by the Member States. For instance, it is 
stated that ‘in evaluating possible infringements, the Commission will take into 
account the specific sensitivity of the defence sector’.43  
 
In the light of the above, the content, emphasis and tone of the Commission’s 
Communication suggest a gradual shift towards the normalisation of the application 
of Article 296 EC: rather than enabling Member States to approach it as the source of 
legal ambiguity and political sensitivity, it is to become subject to the Community law 
mechanisms of interpretation and enforcement, account being taken of the political 
and economic specificity of the defence industries. This is a significant development 
not only because of the apparent political sensitivity of the area, but also because of 
the number of developments and initiatives which have rendered placed the defence 
industries at the centre of EU legislative and political dialogue. It is within this 
context, outlined in the following section,  that Article 296 EC, and the Commission’s 
recent approach to it, need to be assessed.  
 
Policy initiatives within the EC legal order and beyond  
The Commission’s recent expression of intent to enforce a stricter interpretation of 
Article 296 EC is not an isolated and random measure. Instead, it was designed as part 
of a wider and concerted host of policy initiatives focused on the rationalisation of the 
European defence industries.  
 
These initiatives, outlined in advance and in a state of gestation for some time, 44 were 
formalised and presented in December 2007 as the Commission’s ‘defence package’. 
This consists of three measures. The first is a Communication on the competitiveness 
of the defence industry in which the Commission sets out a number of measures 
which would strengthen the European defence market.45 These include common 
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procurement rules, rules on intra-community transfers, the promotion of the use of 
common standards, the development of an EU system on security of information, the 
possibility of a common control system of strategic defence assets, and a host of 
measures aiming aimed at improving overall coordination between national 
authorities in the process of defence planning and investment. 
 
The first two of the above measures were further articulated by the Commission in the 
form of specific legislative proposals adopted on the same date. In the area of defence 
procurement, a proposal for a Directive on public procurement of arms, munitions, 
war material, and related works and services was put forward.46 Following from a 
long period of consultation,47 this proposal is based on the assumption that the highly 
fragmented state of the defence markets has serious implications for the European 
taxpayer, the competitiveness of the European defence industries and the 
effectiveness of the European Security and Defence. The main objective of this 
proposal is to introduce transparency and non-discrimination in an area where legal 
ambiguity and political considerations have imposed national solutions on the basis of 
considerations often at odds with economic efficiency. A central feature of the 
proposed Directive is the acknowledgement of the specific requirements of defence 
procurement: its preamble refers to them ‘in terms of complexity, security of 
information or security of supply’.48 To that effect, provision is made to allow 
Member States flexibility in the process of the negotiation of all aspects of the award 
as well as to impose specific clauses in order to ensure the confidentiality of sensitive 
information.  
 
The second proposal adopted by the Commission in December 2007 is for a Directive 
on intra-Community transfers.49 It targets the existing divergent national licenscing 
regimes and suggests their simplification and harmonisation. Its aim is twofold: on the 
one hand to facilitate specialisation and industrial cooperation within the EU, hence, 
strengthening the European defence industries; on the other hand, to improve security 
of supply of European defence products for Member States.  
 
                                                 
46
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In addition to the above, the Commission has also dealt with the area of research and 
development. In 2004, it produced a document about the need to focus on research 
and development in the area of security.50 The main tenet of this proposal is the 
development of a coherent security research programme at EU level which would be 
‘capability-driven, targeted at the development of interoperable systems, products and 
services useful for the protection of European citizens, territory and critical 
infrastructures as well as for peacekeeping activities’ whilst also directly linked to 
‘the good functioning of such key European services as transport and energy 
supply’.51 Four different areas are targeted: consultation and cooperation with users, 
industry and research organisations under the umbrella of a European Security 
Research Advisory Board; the establishment of a European Security Research 
Programme implemented as a specific programme with its own set of procedures, 
rules for participation, contracts and funding arrangements; cooperation with other 
institutional actors established under the CFSP and ESDP framework and especially 
the European Defence Agency; the establishment of a structure which would ensure 
the flexible and effective management of the European Security Research 
Programme. In addition to the above, the Commission also adopted a Green Paper on 
Defence Procurement.52  
 
So far, this section has examined the various initiatives undertaken by the 
Commission in order to address the status and rationalisation needs of the European 
defence industries within the Community legal order. However, there is a parallel 
development seeking to serve similar objectives and originating beyond the 
Community legal order. This development follows directly from the process of the 
drafting of the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe. Whilst While this 
Treaty proved to be ill-fated, it is significant in the context of this analysis because it 
provided for a number of innovations which were in fact taken up by the EU 
institutions as a matter of policy prior to the protracted death of the Treaty and which 
are maintained in the Lisbon Treaty.   
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The Constitutional Treaty provided for the establishment of an agency under the name 
of European Defence Agency (EDA) which would be specialised in the area of 
defence capabilities development, research, acquisition and armaments.53 This was 
reproduced in the Lisbon Treaty, according to which the Agency ‘shall identify 
operational requirements, shall promote measures to satisfy those requirements, shall 
contribute to identifying and, where appropriate, implementing any measure needed to 
strengthen the industrial and technological base of the defence sector, shall participate 
in defining a European capabilities and armaments policy, and shall assist the Council 
in evaluating the improvement of military capabilities’.54 
 
However, the establishment of this Agency became an issue separate from the fate of 
the Constitutional Treaty. Following a decision by the Thessaloniki European Council 
in June 2003, the Council set up an intergovernmental agency in the field of defence 
capabilities pursuant to a Joint Action in July 2004.55 The objective of the Agency is 
‘to support the Council and the Member States in their effort to improve the EU’s 
defence capabilities in the field of crisis management and to sustain the ESDP as it 
stands now and develops in the future’ without prejudice to either the competences of 
the EC or those of the Member States in defence matters.56 The tasks carried out by 
EDA are in the areas of defence capabilities development, armaments cooperation, 
European Defence Technological and industrial base and defence equipment market, 
and research and technology. 
 
A general assessment of the function and record of EDA is beyond the scope of this 
Chapter.57 Instead, it is its more recent initiative in the area of defence procurement 
which is relevant. In November 2005, the Defence Ministers of all the then 
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participating Member States,58 agreed a voluntary code on defence procurement. This 
entered into force on 1 July 2006.59 This Code applies to contracts worth more than 
€1m which are covered by Article 296 EC.60 It sets out to establish a single online 
portal, provided by the EDA, which would publicize procurement opportunities. It is 
based on objective award criteria based on the most economically advantageous 
solution for the particular requirement. Furthermore, it provides for debriefing, 
whereby all unsuccessful bidders who so request will be given feedback after the 
contract is awarded. The regime provides for exceptions for reasons of pressing 
operational urgency, follow-on work or supplementary goods and services, and 
extraordinary and compelling reasons of national security. An interesting aspect of 
this regime is its focus, amongst others, on small and medium-sized enterprises and 
non-traditional supplies. The development of the portal for industry contract 
opportunities enables them to find sub-contracting opportunities listed in the same 
place, and, hence, help them in a tangible manner to participate in the developing 
transnational market.   
 
The objective of this regime is to introduce transparency in defence procurement and 
increase the competitiveness of defence industries. The EDA considers the regime a 
success. In the first year of its application, governments advertised nearly 200 contract 
opportunities worth approximately €10 billion on the European Bulletin Board online 
portal. In its Report on European Security and Defence Policy, approved by the 
Council in June 2007, the German Presidency stated that the Agency ‘was proving 
itself a fully effective instrument’61 and implementation of the Code of Conduct was 
seen as ‘successful’.62 
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A multilayered approach: incrementally towards relative normalisation  
 
This Chapter has highlighted the development of a gradual shift of the legal position 
of defence industries from a terra incognita shrouded by legal ambiguity to a legal 
space within the Union constitutional order and the Community legal order where it 
attracts institutional attention both at supranational and intergovernmental level. The 
combined effect of the initiatives outlined above is the gradual normalisation of the 
position of defence industries and the growing emphasis on the relevance of EU law 
to its consolidation and restructuring. This normalisation is facilitated by the emphasis 
on the economic argument for the reliance upon common formulas. It is noteworthy 
that a starting point for all the Commission’s initiatives is the stagnation and lack of 
competitiveness of the European defence industries. In an interesting parallel, the 
Commission recently proposed the imposition of criminal sanctions for serious 
violations of EC rules on exports of dual-use goods in order to ensure their effective 
application.63 Following the judgment in C-176/03 Commission v Council (re: 
environmental crimes),64 it suggested the application of this controversial instrument 
in an area which had been viewed for a long time to be too sensitive for Community 
regulation. It remains to be seen whether this proposal will be taken up.65 It is will be 
recalled that in the area of dual-use goods it was following two judgments of the 
Court of Justice66 when that the export of such products became subject to the full 
discipline of EC law. Be that as it may, and whilstWhile the analogy with the legal 
regime of defence industries can only go so far, this is an interesting example of how 
‘legal normalisation’ may occur in areas of acute political sensitivity. 
 
However, it should be stressed that the origins of this gradual shift towards 
normalisation have been political as well as economic and legal. The development of 
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the European Security and Defence Policy, the emphasis on the Union’s security 
identity in the process of drafting and debating the Constitutional Treaty, the range of 
operations undertaken by the European Union around the world, all point towards the 
increasing significance of this policy for the development of the EU. This underlines, 
inevitably, the significance of its effectiveness which is undermined by the serious 
problems facing the defence industries. Therefore, a European defence industry 
riddled with economic problems would always prove to be an inherent limit to the 
effectiveness and efficiency of ESDP. This political dimension is central to the recent 
Commission’s initiatives. In the proposed Directive on defence procurement, for 
instance, the very first recital of the preamble states that ‘[t]he gradual establishment 
of a European defence equipment market is essential for strengthening the defence 
industrial and technological base in Europe and developing the military capabilities 
required to implement the European Security and Ddefence Policy’.67  
 
It is interesting that one of the main contributions of the process of drafting, 
negotiating and ratifying the Constitutional Treaty should be to render the ESDP, an 
intergovernmental policy par excellence, at the very centre of the Union’s 
development and create the momentum for addressing the requirements for its 
effectiveness. The fate iof the Constitutional Treaty did not undermine this 
momentum as illustrated, at policy level, by the initiatives of supranational as well as 
intergovernmental actors in this area which had been considered, until recently, alien 
to any common regulatory initiative imposed from above. In this vein, it is 
noteworthy that the European Security and Defence Policy is the most popular EU 
policy: the January 2007 Eurobarometer shows a 75% score of approval for having 
such a policy (in UK this the figure was 57% - ; only Sweden and Ireland scored 
lower). In other words, there is a clear political as well as economic imperative for the 
rationalisation of the defence industries. 
 
However, precisely because of the political underpinnings of any effort to rationalise 
the defence industries, the process suggested by the recent initiatives outlined in this 
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Chapter is bound to be met with caution, be long in its elaboration and not devoid of 
uncertainties in its application. Put it differently, the process of normalisation 
suggested above will be inherently relative in its substance and effects. At an 
institutional level, the developing position of defence industries is addressed on the 
basis of an approach which is multilayered in its scope and involves a variety of 
institutional actors. It suggests reliance upon legal as well as voluntary measures and 
engages the EC and the intergovernmental level of governance for its implementation. 
Whilst While this approach addresses the multifarious dimensions of, and interests 
underpinning, the regulation of defence industries, it would also give rise to inter-
institutional tensions which may slow down the process and hamper its effectiveness. 
For instance, it will be interesting to see how the Commission’s initiative in the area 
of defence procurement would work along with the EDA Code of Conduct. Whilest 
their scope of application differs (the former applies to products covered by Article 
296 EC, whilst the latter applies to products beyond the scope of Article 296 EC), the 
definition of the dividing line between the two is likely to be less clear cut than the 
Commission services envisage. The Commission is keen to stress the complementary 
nature of these initiatives.68 However, any inter-institutional disputes in this area 
would be bound to be exacerbated by the political underpinnings of their subject-
matter.  
 
In terms of policy-making, for all the activity in the legislative sphere, the political 
will of the Member States for any substantial progress to be achieved is vital. This is 
not only in relation to the extent to which the Member States decide to commit 
themselves to this process, but also, in substantive terms, their willingness to bring 
about a convergence in their views of procurement policy.69 Such commitment is 
essentially political in nature and cannot be forced on the Member States by means of 
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secondary legislation.70 In this respect, knowing the limits of the function of legal 
rules is to know how to rely upon them and with which other initiatives to combine 
them. In this respect, a related factor which will test the viability of the Commission’s 
proposals is the climate of economic nationalism71 which appears to be increasingly 
popular in a number of Member States. Taking the form of measures preventing the 
takeover of domestic companies deemed ‘national champions’ from by other EU 
companies, national governments did not hide their willingness to adopt such tactics 
in high profile cases in Germany, France, Italy, Spain and Poland last year.72  
 
Conclusion  
 
This Chapter told the story of a policy shift regarding an industry associated with the 
core of national sovereignty: once shrouded in legal ambiguity, political sensitivity 
and institutional caution, defence industries are gradually brought towards the centre 
of the EU constitutional framework and the Community legal order. The central 
position of their rationalisation for the effective conduct of the European Security and 
Defence Policy has created a political imperative which neither the Community 
institutions nor the Member states can afford to ignore. Viewed from this angle, the 
new interpretation of Article 296 EC suggested by the Commission along with the 
legislative proposals which it unveiled in December 2007 are welcome.  
 
While the problems which their adoption would face should not be underestimated,73 
Whether they will be accepted by the Member States and, if so, to what extent, 
remains to be seen.  
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However, the very fact that these initiatives have been undertaken by the Commission 
is in itself a positive development. In policy terms, any progress made along the way 
is bound to be positive beneficial for to the competitiveness of the defence industries 
as well as the effectiveness of ESDP. Currently, the defence procurement market 
accounts for a large share of EU public procurement (it is estimated at about €80 
billion out of a combined State defence budget of € 170 billion).74 More generally, the 
initiatives discussed in this Chapter suggest that the momentum build from the 
process from the process of drafting the Constitutional Treaty regarding the 
development of ESDP is not only maintained but also develops a new focus on the 
practical aspects of that policy which had been overlooked in the past. This 
development illustrates a shift from the rhetoric about the effective role of the 
European Union as a security and defence actor to the actual requirements for this role 
to be carried out.  
 
Finally, the pace of the shift outlined in this Chapter will be determined pursuant to as 
many and diverse factors as the policy needs which underpinned its genesis. After all, 
none of the initiatives discussed and the measures proposed may be assessed in 
isolation. They need to be understood as parts of a gradually shifting, constantly 
evolving, multi-faceted legal and political space. It is their combined effect which 
would shape the position of defence industries in the Community legal order and the 
Union framework.   
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